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Corporate tour operators 
A B S T R A C T   
This paper studies the productive role of innovation in organisations. Using the post-structuralist insight that 
innovation is an open concept that can become performative, we shift the emphasis from analysing innovations 
themselves to analysing how the concept of innovation affects the organisational practices through which it 
acquires meaning. Deploying this framework, we studied the development of an innovation unit within TUI, a 
corporate tour operator. We found that actors interpreted innovation in different ways and that initially the 
innovation unit was considered a failure. The subsequent dramatisation of this failure resulted in a new version 
of this innovation unit that strengthened established actors and institutions within the organisation. Our study 
shows how the use of the concept of innovation in an organisation can both stimulate and hamper its innova-
tiveness. Addressing this paradox requires sensitivity to the concept’s productive role and evaluations of inno-
vation that look beyond accomplished results.   
1. Introduction 
“Actively shaping change and successfully tackling external factors 
and market challenges are two of TUI’s strengths. We delivered 
double-digit growth for four consecutive years.” 
(TUI Group, 2019, p. 6) 
In their 2019 annual report TUI addressed their shareholders with 
confidence. A few months later, facing a global pandemic and related 
market challenges, German government-provided financial stabilisation 
packages worth €2.0bn are keeping the “the world’s leading integrated 
tourism group” afloat (TUI Group, 2020). One year earlier, TUI’s 
long-term rival Thomas Cook failed to obtain a similar bailout after a 
planned restructuring was stopped at the last minute, and collapsed 
(Collinson, 2019). 
Shock events like these tend to expose the weaknesses of established 
organisations (Klein, 2007). Many different explanations for these 
weaknesses have been offered. Some reiterate the known business flaws 
of package holiday conglomerates (see e.g. Collinson, 2019). Others 
critique the volume growth model for tourism and its negative impacts 
on public health and climate change (see e.g. Gössling, Scott, & Hall, 
2020). This retrospective finger-pointing can be very relevant, but it 
shrouds the complexities inherent to innovation from within (Akrich, 
Callon, & Latour, 2002a). 
Even when they want to, established organisations like Thomas Cook 
and TUI cannot easily change directions. Various dependencies, such as 
past accomplishments, current routines, and future commitments, shape 
their path (see Van Assche, Beunen, & Duineveld, 2014). They face, in 
other words, what management literature describes as the rigidity of 
their own business model (see Doz & Kosonen, 2010). To deliver on 
growth promises in saturated markets of their own making, tasks are 
often standardised, and an operation-focused, efficiency-driven culture 
is manifested. Those conditioned in such environments are usually well 
aware that long-term success necessitates the exploration of new ave-
nues (see Gonthier & Chirita, 2019): they simply succumb to the 
inherent political pressures that come with talk of innovation (see e.g. 
Smith, Ree, & Murray, 2016). Innovation can introduce risks that 
compromises efficiency and is therefore often ruled out (Christensen & 
Raynor, 2003). This raises questions about innovativeness (Tajeddini, 
2010), the creation and adoption of novelty from within. 
Innovation is a vague but fashionable concept. It has many meanings 
and, regardless of their content, it mainly evokes positive connotations 
(Bontems, 2014). Within tourism innovation research (see Pikkemaat, 
Peters, & Bichler, 2019 for the latest review), a sizeable body of litera-
ture addresses the innovativeness of tourism organisations (see e.g. Fraj, 
Matute, & Melero, 2015; Kallmuenzer & Peters, 2018; Martínez-Román, 
Tamayo, Gamero, & Romero, 2015; Tajeddini, 2010). In this literature, 
organisations are unquestioningly understood as ‘firms’, distinct 
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constructs separable from their performance (Guérard, Langley, & Seidl, 
2013), and innovation is seen as a management tool. It is reduced to 
proxy variables that stand in hierarchical, causal, or inclusive relations 
with each other (cf. Kooij, Van Assche, & Lagendijk, 2012; Law & Urry, 
2005). As a result the focus is on measuring its assumed steering power 
to explain or direct organisational performance. 
In contrast to these instrumentalist approaches, interpretivist ap-
proaches consider innovation a dynamic process in different organisa-
tional settings (see e.g. Lowe, Williams, & Shaw et al., 2012; Nordin & 
Hjalager, 2017; Rodriguez-Sanchez, Williams, & Brotons, 2019; Smith, 
Rees, & Murray, 2016; Zhang, Kimbu, & Lin et al., 2020). Innovation is 
seen as the progressive entrepreneurial or intrapreneurial achievement 
of creative and knowledgeable persons collaborating in teams, 
self-organising networks, or coalitions. The focus is on the perspective of 
these individuals to identify or understand different antecedents that 
can explain their actions and the resulting innovations. 
Each approach has its own merits. Instrumentalist approaches 
advance innovation measurement, deemed important for comparison 
and benchmarking (Montresor, 2018; Camisón & Monfort-Mir, 2012). 
Interpretivist approaches uncover different forms of freedom, i.e. to set 
goals, to fail, and to build coalitions of likeminded souls, as important 
sources of innovation. Yet, central to both is an actor-focused interpre-
tation of agency: innovation usually emanates from specific organisa-
tional attributes or from the (combined) character traits and cognition, i. 
e. the acquired knowledge and skills of specific (collaborating) entre-
preneurial or intrapreneurial people (see Garud, Gehman, & Giuliani, 
2014). The possibility that the idea or concept of innovation itself also 
accumulates an agency of some kind remains unaddressed in these two 
bodies of literature. Through its presence and use in organisations, 
‘innovation’ as a concept and idea – aided by its inherent vagueness – 
can evoke multiple meanings and serve different purposes (Kooij et al., 
2012). 
By means of a case study, this paper therefore investigates the use 
and effects of innovation as a concept in a specific tourism organisation, 
namely TUI Benelux. Apart from a study on Thomas Cook by Smith et al. 
(2016), there is little research examining ‘innovation’ in corporate tour 
operators, despite their substantial role in shaping the international 
tourism industry. As part of the TUI Group, TUI Benelux is a cluster 
organisation of TUI Netherlands and TUI Belgium, which each serve 
their respective source markets, but operate under a shared manage-
ment board for reasons of efficiency as part of TUI’s corporate strategy 
(TUI Group, 2018). Over a period of 18 months, we traced the devel-
opment of an innovation unit in this organisation. 
For our analysis, we turned to an alternative approach to instru-
mentalist and interpretivist studies of innovation, sensitive to the more 
political uses of the concept of innovation in organisations (Kooij et al., 
2012): post-structuralist organisation and governance theory (Van 
Assche, Beunen, Duineveld, & Gruzbacher, 2020; Van Assche et al., 
2014; Czarniawska, 1998, 2004, 2009; Kooij et al., 2012). Two inter-
related ideas shape the theoretical framework of this study: open con-
cepts and performativity. Open concepts are seemingly vague concepts 
that lack inherent substance, i.e. specific technical or ideological defi-
nition, and can therefore create meaning or give direction without 
disclosing much detail (Kooij et al., 2012). Performativity is the 
self-fulfilling effect of written and spoken communication (Mackenzie, 
Muniesa, & Siu, 2007), and invites us to probe the functions of concepts 
in language (Czarniawska, 2009). Combined, these ideas can help us 
shift focus from the alleged substance of the concept of innovation to its 
productive functions in an organisation and trace how it sorts different 
reality effects. By reality effects we mean: changes in shared un-
derstandings of an organisation’s past, present, and future that can be 
observed in organisational practices and that inform coordinated action 
(Van Assche et al., 2020). 
This paper proceeds as follows. The next section presents our theo-
retical framework in further detail. Section 3 explains our methods. 
Section 4 presents the evolution of an innovation unit in TUI Benelux, 
and section 5 analyses the reality effects we observed in this process. 
Based on the results, we propose a new, more reflexive approach to 
understanding and implementing innovation in organisations in section 
6. 
2. Theoretical framework 
In post-structuralist organisation and governance theory, organisa-
tions are not seen as fixed and clearly delineated entities, but as emer-
gent and evolving effect of organisational practices (Czarniawska, 
2004). In this view, an organisation is not a pre-given entity or ‘fact’ but 
the result of numerous communications that collectively produce mul-
tiple, overlapping representations of a single organisation (Czarniawska, 
2009). This conceptualisation of organisations has major consequences 
for the analysis and understanding of innovation in organisations. 
Conceiving organisations such as ‘firms’ and ‘start-ups’ as dynamic and 
complex processes instead of fixed actors, fully able to steer and control 
their development (Kooij et al., 2012; Law, 2001), opens the door to 
probe the political, arbitrary, and contingent dimensions of innovation 
in organisational practices. 
2.1. Innovation as open concept 
To deepen our understanding of the role of the concept of innovation 
in organisational practices, we add the notion of open concepts to our 
framework. According to Kooij et al. (2012), the seeming vagueness of 
open concepts creates space for multiple interpretations of an organi-
sation and its practices to co-exist. This multiplicity accommodates the 
construction of temporal certainties – evident for instance in vision and 
strategy documents – that veil the general impossibility of knowing or 
fully steering the future. Innovation is an open concept because of its 
inherent lack of substance (Bontems, 2014). It can mean and imply 
many things for different people and in different contexts. Thus, con-
ceptualising innovation as an open concept enables us to trace how it 
evokes different meanings as organisations and the related actors mould 
it into various shapes in their efforts to mobilise support for their 
‘innovative’ ideas, and implement change in organisations (Akrich, 
Callon, & Latour, 2002b). To analyse the reality effects emerging from 
this process, we now turn to performativity. 
2.2. Performativity: the reality effects of innovation 
Performativity highlights that the discursive use of the concept of 
innovation in organisational practices can be productive in itself, 
regardless of the value attached to the outcomes. The ‘innovative’ ideas 
produced within an organisation can result in the emergence of new 
actors and institutions, resistance, and altered patterns of inclusion and 
exclusion of knowledge and ways of thinking (Van Assche et al., 2014). 
These reality effects cannot be assumed beforehand but have to be 
observed in actual practices (Kooij et al., 2012). Thus, simply by being 
discursively present, the concept of innovation can become productive 
and induce change in anticipated and unanticipated ways. 
To identify how innovation became productive in TUI Benelux, we 
distinguish between the generative and the transformative function of 
innovation as an open concept. The generative function entails the ca-
pacity of open concepts to simultaneously generate different represen-
tations of the organisation. As innovation can assume various shapes, 
the concept evokes different understandings of an organisation’s past, 
present, and future, and corresponding tensions and conflicts (Van 
Assche et al., 2020). Innovation can confront actors with their own 
conflicting loyalties, i.e. to direct colleagues, the organisation, clients, 
and their personal networks, even within a single project or practice 
(Grabher, 2004). This multiplicity highlights that innovation can stim-
ulate divergences in organisational practices. Rather than producing 
instant shifts in perspectives, the concept serves multiple representa-
tions of the organisation at once. Its conceptual vagueness 
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accommodates flexible interpretation, which enables actors to reflect 
and look ahead (Van Assche et al., 2020). 
The transformative function concerns the capacity of open concepts 
to facilitate change in organisational routines, for instance through 
gradual institutionalisation of new ideas (Van Assche et al., 2014). 
Flexible interpretation accommodates the co-existence of different 
meanings and interpretations of innovation and its organisation (Kooij 
et al., 2012). This can enable actors to buy more time, mask their in-
tentions, and/or avoid conflict in the process of mobilising support for 
their ideas (Van Assche et al., 2014). Such competitions for influence can 
create convergences in organisational practices. Actors are necessarily 
required to find broader strategic acceptance of their positions. Mobi-
lising support through coalition building is considered an important 
stage of the innovation process (see e.g. Nordin & Hjalager, 2017; 
Rodriguez-Sanchez et al., 2019), but it also narrows one’s options over 
time. Coalitions can bring focus to discussions that first moved in many 
different directions. Coalitions can produce rules and norms that struc-
ture interactions and that make distinct organisational representations 
more stable and lasting (Van Assche et al., 2020). 
3. Methods 
After a series of meetings with TUI managers in the Netherlands in 
2016 and early 2017, we were invited to study the development of an 
innovation unit in TUI Benelux up close, for a prolonged period of time, 
and with access to key informants (TUI staff directly involved, senior 
management, and external advisors). A case-study approach was sub-
sequently adopted. The case-study method is deemed suitable for 
exploring less accessible, unique organisational practices (see Tasci, 
Wei, & Mildman, 2020). 
Our case – the development of an innovation unit in TUI Benelux – 
consisted of a collection of innovation unit meetings and workshops at 
various (external) locations, (management) meetings about the inno-
vation unit, and related communications (email exchanges, informal 
conversations) that followed each other in rapid succession, happened at 
several places at once, but within a specific organisational context. We 
therefore opted for an iterative case-study design common in research 
premised on post-structuralist thought (see Beard, Scarles, & Tribe, 
2016). Its integrated process of data generation and analysis granted us 
the required mobility and flexibility in the field (see Czarniawska, 
2004): the possibility to change directions and include new events or 
informants during the inquiry as we learned more about innovation in 
TUI Benelux. 
We entered the field in August 2017, when the development of the 
innovation unit began. We left in April 2018, after the process had 
(temporarily) stalled, but returned in June 2019 for a reflection (and 
learned about the unit’s re-emergence). We generated data through 
direct observation and interviews. We observed different innovation 
unit events as they unfolded (see Table 1). We used these events to 
present ourselves, our research, and to relate to and understand the TUI 
staff equipped with the task of shaping and operating the unit (‘the 
innovation team’). We made descriptive observations (for instance of 
people, locations, presentations, and discussions) and interpretative ob-
servations (for instance our perceptions of the atmosphere, the in-
teractions between people). We recorded these observations in field 
notes and a research diary. 
Alongside, we interviewed members of the organisation directly and 
indirectly involved in the development of the innovation unit (see 
Table 2). We used these interviews to trace interpretations of this pro-
cess as informants reflected on – and made sense of – what had happened 
(see Czarniawska, 2004). In 2017, using a pre-tested topic list, we 
conducted 9 semi-structured interviews with innovation team members. In 
addition, we facilitated a focus group discussion (FGD) during the second 
innovation team event, in which innovation team members collectively 
identified, visualised, and clustered items enabling or hampering inno-
vation in TUI. In 2018 and 2019, 4 unstructured interviews with TUI 
Benelux executive board members – senior managers commissioning 
and supporting the innovation unit undertaking – served to facilitate 
retrospective reflections on the innovation unit process and the lessons 
learned, and complemented data generation. Inherent to our iterative 
approach, respondents were selected using a combination of purposive 
and snowball sampling (see Beard et al., 2016). The last unstructured 
interview (with R13) turned out to be of profound importance for our 
study as this respondent played a pivotal role in our case. Interviews 
lasted between 35 and 104 min. All interviews were audio-recorded and 
transcribed at verbatim (in Dutch). 
In this study we had very useful access to key informants. The 
participating TUI staff have been helpful, welcoming, and open to 
discuss issues during interviews and innovation unit events. Overall, the 
applied techniques enabled us to identify and follow the evolution of the 
innovation unit. Yet, regardless of the duration of fieldwork and the 
techniques deployed, access is always precarious and partial (Czar-
niawska, 1998). In the field, we positioned ourselves as researchers. 
Despite being overt about our role, we sporadically got the impression 
that some informants viewed us as innovation experts rather than 
Table 1 
Observed innovation unit events.  
Event Participants Duration Date 
Kick-off innovation team Innovation team, 
external advisors, board 
member 
6 h 31-08- 
2017 
Reflection kick-off innovation 
team 
Coordinator 1 h 04-09- 
2017 




1 h 04-09- 
2017 
Preparation next innovation 
team meeting 








2 h 18-09- 
2017 
2nd Innovation team event 
(introduction innovation 
engine) & FGD 
Innovation team, 
external advisor, board 
member 
6 h 28-09- 
2017 
3rd innovation team event 
(visioning) 




4th innovation team event 
(operationalisation) 
Innovation team 3 h 22-12- 
2017 




Reflection innovation team Coordinator 2 h 03-04- 
2018  
Table 2 
Interviews and respondents.  
Respondent Expertise as stated in job title Date 
Semi-structured interviews 
R1 Corporate policy 21-11-2017 
R2 Sales 13-09-2017 
R3 Digital innovation 23-11-2017 
R4 Innovation 27-10-2017 
R5 Product management 17-10-2017 
R6 Human resources 28-11-2017 
R7 Retail 19-10-2017 
R8 Human resources 14-11-2017 
R9 ICT 26-10-2017 
Unstructured interviews 
R10 Executive 19-01-2018 
R11 Executive 19-01-2018 
R12 Executive 19-01-2018 
R13 Executive 06-06-2019  
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researchers and welcomed our inputs. To maintain optimal access in 
these cases, we sometimes had to shift our role from observer to 
participant-observer. This may have influenced the practices we subse-
quently observed: our presence and contributions may have helped 
others in creating arguments that further legitimised – or delegitimised – 
aspired courses of action (see Czarniawska, 2001). Related, organisa-
tional hierarchies and pecking orders arguably confined group discus-
sions during the observed events. Specific participant observation 
techniques, such as shadowing and observant participation (see Czar-
niawska, 2004), could have provided further insights into these insti-
tutionalised repertoires, i.e. by contrasting our direct observations of the 
events with observations of less visible, informal practices that existed 
outside of these events. 
In our data we traced the innovation unit as a token (see Beard et al., 
2016): a circulating quasi-object that transforms through the discussions 
it evokes (Latour, 1996). Data analysis comprised three steps: (i) we 
repeatedly read the interview transcripts, observational notes, and 
research diary to familiarise ourselves with all data; (ii) we chronolog-
ically ordered relevant data to identify the aggregated sequence of 
events constituting the innovation unit’s evolution; and (iii) we used 
combinations of initial and focused coding (see Charmaz, 2014) to 
detect multiple, evolving interpretations of TUI, innovation (within 
TUI), and the innovation unit. In terms of data triangulation, we treated 
the interviews as standard accounts – distinct representations of TUI’s 
institutionalised repertoire – and the observations as interfering ac-
counts that did not share this interpretative tradition (see Czarniawska, 
2009). We regularly discussed our interpretations of the data and 
reviewed the coding process. And we deployed document analysis 
(websites, annual reports, academic publications) to verify, supplement, 
and contextualise data. Initial findings were shared with TUI Benelux. 
Meetings with key informants in April 2018 and June 2019 further 
enhanced our interpretations. The result is a comprehensive case-study 
account illustrating the innovation unit’s evolution and related reality 
effects, as presented next. 
4. Case: innovation in TUI Benelux 
First, we situate our case in its organisational context. Then we 
present the evolution of the innovation unit. 
4.1. TUI, a brief history 
The history of present-day TUI is one of corporate venturing. It 
started around the millennium when the German company Preussag, a 
diversified industrial conglomerate at the time, implemented what 
Dittmann, Maug, and Schneider (2008) describe as a rarely seen strategy 
of business migration. Holdings in mining, oil exploration, and ship-
building were disinvested; different tourism-related companies were 
bought. Among the acquisitions was TUI: Germany’s main tour operator. 
Preussag changed its name to TUI in 2002 and has developed its tourism 
enterprises ever since. Through vertical integration it sought control of 
the entire tourism value chain and directed consumers to 
company-owned airlines, hotels, and cruise ships to secure high occu-
pancy rates. Shareholdings in different hotel groups were acquired and 
large tour operators in Europe’s main source markets, including Belgium 
and the Netherlands, were procured. In 2007, the tour operating busi-
ness of TUI AG merged with the UK listed company First Choice to form 
the London Stock Exchange listed company TUI Travel PLC, which 
merged in 2014 into the TUI Group. 
TUI Group is presently structured as a matrix organisation based on 
the components of its core business (Markets & Airlines; Cruises; 
Destination Experiences) and the source markets of its tour operator 
acquisitions (Northern, Central, and Western Region). TUI Netherlands 
and TUI Belgium form the TUI Benelux cluster of the Western Region 
Segment (TUI Group, 2018). They operate under a shared TUI Benelux 
management board. 
In the Benelux as well as elsewhere, stories of mounting pressure on 
the standard package holiday market had been circulating for years (see 
e.g. World Tourism Organisation, 2004). Today’s challenges include 
strong competition, low margins, seasonality, and the impending market 
entrance of global tech companies like Google (R12). To address these 
challenges and safeguard its future, TUI adopted a new strategy in 2014, 
transforming itself into a so-called integrated tourism company that 
offers customers an end-to-end holiday experience (flights, hotels, 
cruises, activities) (see TUI Group, 2018). 
The TUI Benelux board (hereafter referred to as board) welcomed 
TUI’s transformation despite the enormous challenge of implementing 
the new strategy. The different country offices of TUI Nederland and TUI 
Belgium had to be aligned with the new matrix organisation of the 
Western Region Segment. The purpose of the matrix organisation was to 
have different departments learn from one another, the rapid transfer of 
“successful models” from one market to another, and harmonisation of 
“non-customer facing activities” (TUI Group 2018, p. 7). This trans-
formation proved more difficult than expected: 
‘We have seven content departments now… seven! And that’s only in 
our region! So, the effort put in coordinating that is enormous. At the 
same time, we need to merge things within the company, simplify 
things. At present, we do a lot of double work. In my opinion, that is 
the biggest challenge for top-level management.’ (R11) 
The board realised that the on-going strategic realignment process 
constrained rather than improved the identification and uptake of new 
ideas in TUI Benelux, and that – as a result – they wasted a lot of po-
tential (R11, R12). In January 2017, they therefore decided to set up an 
innovation unit. This unit, they envisioned, would operate as a cross- 
functional team rather than a business incubator independently pursu-
ing new business opportunities (see Gonthier & Chirita, 2019; O’Reilly 
& Tushman, 2004). It would identify and centralise the different inno-
vation initiatives in the organisation (R10; R11). A senior manager 
(hereafter referred to as C.) was assigned to coordinate this process, and 
form an interdepartmental team. 
4.2. The evolution of an innovation unit in TUI benelux 
On August 9, 2017, fifteen TUI Benelux staff members received an 
email from C. informing them that the board had selected them to join 
TUI Benelux’s innovation team. Recipients held different positions and 
worked in different departments, equally representing TUI Nederland 
and TUI Belgium. 
Three weeks later, ten of the invitees met up. C. led the meeting and 
started with a presentation explaining that participants would develop 
an innovation agenda together. C. emphasised the importance of growth 
– ‘an important Key Performance Indicator (KPI)’ – and reminded par-
ticipants that ‘they had been picked by the board’ to join this initiative. 
C. concluded with some pointers, mainly formulated by the board, about 
organising innovation in TUI: ‘Looking further ahead (2–5 years); Define 
priorities and make an action plan; ‘Thinking’ separated from ‘doing’; 
Facilitate; Structurally rather than ad hoc; Platform for ideas and solu-
tions sourced from stakeholders; Innovation-driven.’ 
A second presentation followed, delivered by an external expert in 
industrial product design, who talked about design thinking techniques. 
Then, participants collectively started working on an innovation agenda 
that resulted in the ranking of twenty problem statements that covered a 
wide range of topics, including sustainability, technology, customer 
relations, human resources, and the relevance of TUI’s business model. 
After this exercise, C. announced that a project management structure 
would set implementation priorities based on internal and external 
needs. This sparked unease among the participants. A discussion started, 
in which the idea of the innovation team got entangled with various 
operational concerns. Participants expressed unease about the board 
controlling the projects, the additional work on top of their regular jobs, 
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the organisation’s culture, and possible friction with operational and 
sales targets. C. tried to calm everybody down by proposing that the 
attendees would answer two questions for themselves: ‘do I want to be 
involved?’; ‘can I get time for this from my manager?’ It was a futile 
attempt. Participants demanded clear targets and deliverables. Energy 
in the room drained. The meeting ended in an employee-manager di-
chotomy and without clear conclusion. C. was disappointed but did not 
give up and called a second meeting on September 29, 2017. 
This time, nine TUI staff (seven had also participated in the kick-off) 
and another external expert (an agile business consultant) gathered in a 
room decorated with pre-drawn flipchart papers. C., who again led the 
meeting, had opted for a more directive approach. C. introduced (a 
flipchart with a drawing of) ‘the innovation engine’ (Fig. 1). This 
innovation engine, which C. had developed earlier with the help of the 
agile business consultant, was a generic innovation process based on 
Cooper’s (2011) stage-gate model. The engine’s purpose, C. explained, 
was to put something in and to get something out. The innovation engine 
consisted of four different silos. The innovation team was supposed to 
staff the engine. In each silo, there would be a smaller team carrying out 
specific tasks. These smaller teams would be ‘self-steering’ and, because 
of that, C. contended, they would ‘automatically add value’. Yet, the 
tasks of these self-steering teams had already been defined on some of 
the flipcharts. The first team would be responsible for portfolio man-
agement, and manage and prioritise the innovation agenda. The second 
team would be the creative engine team, manned with people who could 
‘think out of the box’ to identify solutions to selected problems. The 
third team would set project parameters for implementation, and the 
fourth team would execute the project. Collectively, these teams had to 
ensure that the innovation engine would ‘produce’ ‘innovations’ on a 
three-monthly basis. 
The explanation raised all sorts of questions and turned the conver-
sation to product design, which seemed to narrow the engine’s possi-
bilities. Participants wondered whether the engine was going to 
‘facilitate’ or ‘create’ new ‘products’? Was the engine going to be fed 
with problems, opportunities, or ideas? One participant quoted TUI’s 
Chief Executive Officer, who once said that companies with innovation 
teams often find it unnecessary to ‘create’ things and that it is more 
useful if an innovation team would solve real problems. Others 
wondered whether it was feasible to complete one ‘innovation’ within 
the proposed three-month timeframe? Was this engine capable of 
stimulating an innovation-minded culture in the company? And how to 
measure results? 
‘If you want to see results, how can you do that with opportunities 
only? How do you calculate the results? When you use problems, you 
can measure results.’ (R7) 
There was discussion about vision, scope, and KPIs. About what the 
engine should deliver and what it should not deliver. The engine’s in-
novations had not yet been defined. Yet, there was consensus that TUI 
was an organisation that celebrated success and results first and fore-
most. Therefore, the engine should deliver rapid results and solve 
practical problems fast. They ran out of time with many questions 
unaddressed. 
‘The main thing I remembered (from that meeting) was the lack of a 
goal and the road towards it’ (R1) 
‘Are we the ones that should decide upon the future of TUI? It was 
completely unclear what was supposed to happen.’ (R4) 
The meeting ended without a clear conclusion, but one thing had 
become clear. Those who had participated in both meetings had become 
the innovation team of TUI Benelux. 
In the third innovation team meeting, on 29 and 30 November 2017, 
11 TUI staff participated. The vibe was positive. A guest speaker advised 
the innovation team to define their purpose. This inspired the team. 
‘Customer-centric innovation’ was embraced as purpose. They decided 
to address a business problem as a test case: how to motivate customers 
to book again as quickly as possible after their trip? The team came up 
with the travel box concept: a meta-holiday package offer that sells 
customers multiple package holidays at once, strengthens ties with 
customers, and accomplishes lock-in, i.e. high-volume repeat business 
(see Amit & Zott, 2001). There was an atmosphere of enthusiasm when 
Fig. 1. The ‘innovation engine’.  
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the meeting ended. Some proposed to present the team’s purpose to the 
board. 
To continue the discussion and plan for the future of the innovation 
team a follow-up meeting was planned in December 2017. Eight TUI 
staff participated. Initially, there was little trace of the last meeting’s 
enthusiasm. Focus concentrated on the travel box. Some questioned it, 
wondering whether this concept was really ‘customer-centric’. Never-
theless, they decided to proceed with the travel box, eager to demon-
strate commercial success. To this end, C. proposed a multiple-day 
design sprint in which an external facilitator would push the team to 
develop a solution. This proposal went down well and the meeting 
ended. 
The design sprint took place from 6 to 8 February 2018. Nine TUI 
staff were present. The external facilitator asked the team to do various 
assignments, including goal-setting exercises and customer interview 
role plays. They had to develop a pitch and sell their ideas to the board. 
After 3 days, despite all good intentions, they still lacked concrete 
output. Energy levels were low. People wanted to go home. At that 
moment, C. started a discussion about the next steps and proposed to 
send the outcomes of the design sprint to the Project Management Office 
(PMO), a department responsible for the implementation of ICT-related 
projects in TUI Benelux. This caused a stir. Some were worried they 
would end up at the bottom of PMO’s priority list. C. acknowledged that, 
at PMO, ‘must have’ comes first, and ‘nice to have’ second, and said PMO 
would be difficult to convince. They also knew they could not show up at 
the board with half-baked ideas and felt they had not progressed much 
since December. C. concluded. 
‘If I don’t believe in this product, if I don’t believe in it, then, who 
does?’ 
At the end of the design sprint, we observed a sense of failure. Despite 
all the hard work, the travel box concept had remained a concept and the 
team stood empty-handed. 
At first, the idea of the innovation engine was kept on the table, as a 
work in progress. In April 2018, its proclaimed purpose was culture 
change by achieving tangible results and vice-versa. The engine was still 
to be fed with ‘problems’ that the business could not solve. ‘Solutions’ at 
the other end would have to demonstrate (quick) success. At least two of 
the four envisioned silo teams were still incomplete. The travel box 
concept also lingered. There were design-sprint participants who wan-
ted to give it another try. Some blamed the external facilitator for its 
initial failure. 
Eventually, as the innovation team disintegrated in the course of that 
spring, the ideas of the innovation engine and travel box stalled. 
‘The whole thing collapsed, there was no follow up. People were 
preoccupied with their main tasks, changed jobs, or left the company 
(…) it did not work.’ (R13) 
Over summer, C. looked into design thinking techniques and took a 
change management course. A consultancy firm was hired to restructure 
C.’s department and to jointly develop an innovation programme that 
would organise ‘real’ innovation in TUI Benelux. This program, named 
the ‘employee journey’, depicted innovation as a 5-pillar employee 
development process. The first pillar was about ‘inspiration’, and con-
sisted of in-company sessions about trends and developments. The sec-
ond pillar they called ‘the academy’, in which employees were offered 
courses in lean methods and design thinking. The third and the fourth 
pillar were ‘accelerators’. The third pillar was about process optimisa-
tion and aimed at efficiency gains: 
‘How can I improve operational processes and make them more 
efficient, so that it no longer is an 8-h but a 6-h task, and I create time 
to work on different things?’ (R13) 
Employees that succeeded in reducing the time they spent on their 
operational tasks could join the ‘accelerator tomorrow programme’ (the 
fourth pillar) and work on new customer-centric products. The fifth 
pillar, ‘the sandbox’, was about playing: experimenting without clear 
targets, for instance with new technologies. By making their own work 
processes more efficient in the third pillar, people created their own 
space to develop new capabilities, which they could subsequently 
deploy for business development and innovation: 
‘Without time and capabilities, it is not possible to work on new 
things anyway.’ (R13) 
Meanwhile, C.’s department had gained prominence. In September 
2018, TUI hired a new innovation head with a background in business 
and innovation rather than ICT. In January 2019, C. joined the TUI 
Benelux board. By June 2019, C. managed a team of fifteen. Most staff 
were new hires; none of them had participated in the innovation team. 
‘Process excellence’ was added to the department’s existing tasks of 
‘business development’ and ‘innovation’. Team members had job titles 
ranging from ‘lean consultants’ and ‘design experts’ to ‘business devel-
opment managers’ and ‘category managers’. In June 2019, when our 
empirical enquiries ended, the implementation of the ‘employee 
journey’ was about to begin. 
5. Analysis: innovation as a concept in TUI Benelux 
We will now analyse our case in three sections. We first analyse 
innovation as an open concept. Then we examine its generative and 
transformative functions. 
5.1. Innovation as an open concept 
In this case study, innovation operated as an open concept. Multiple 
interpretations of innovation emerged, through discussions about 
innovation and the innovation unit, and there was no consensus on its 
meaning (cf. Kooij et al., 2012). 
In the board, some depicted it as an integral aspect of daily opera-
tions (R11), and talked about a constant collective process of imple-
menting incremental improvements that, over time, enabled the 
company to thrive. Others represented it as a means to advance strategy 
(R10). Innovation could comprise anything new, provided it fitted the 
strategy. And there were those who portrayed innovation as something 
that covered multiple scales, distinguishing between small, incremental 
improvements and a strategic exercise to address long-term, more pro-
found issues (R12). 
Innovation team members mostly presented innovation as something 
that would solve problems. Once addressed, there would be success, in 
the shape of (more) growth, relevance, bookings, and/or profit (R2). To 
some, innovation was about creating new products that generated media 
attention and served as a means to earn the company a reputation of 
being innovative (R9). Others talked of innovation in terms of organ-
isational transition, asking oneself existential questions, and getting rid 
of ingrained habits (R3). 
Also, the innovation unit was open to different interpretations. When 
the board decided to establish an innovation unit in January 2017, they 
wanted a panel that would structure and streamline idea uptake in 
support of TUI’s corporate strategy. But during the August 2017 kick-off 
meeting, rather than mapping existing ideas in the organisation, at-
tendees ranked a selection of individually prepared problem statements. 
Those with an interest in changing the product viewed the innovation 
unit as a ‘creative engine’ (R1; R4). They used start-up vocabulary, such 
as design sprints, Minimal Viable Products, and Proof of Concepts, to 
describe their ideas. They talked about (the need for) an external incu-
bator that could develop ideas independent from TUI’s regular proced-
ures (see e.g. Gonthier & Chirita, 2019). Others wanted it to address 
urgent operational issues (R2; R6; R8). As a result, some staff wanted to 
end this babel and expressed a longing for clear definitions: 
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‘We must avoid confusion of tongues. We should be clear about what 
innovation means! Let me ask you the same question; do you know 
what innovation means in TUI? Did people give you the same answer 
ten times? Did people tell you ten times the same about the purpose 
and importance of innovation? Is it just an add-on or is it a necessity? 
If these people gave you the same answer ten times, then it is well 
communicated. If not, then I made my point.’ (R1). 
The multiple interpretations of innovation and the innovation unit 
proved productive in different ways, as presented next. 
5.2. The generative function of innovation 
Discussions about innovation and an innovation unit generated 
different tensions and conflicts. We observed unease about TUI’s con-
centration on short-term gains. Respondents understood that, as part of 
a public listed company, they had to perform. There was constant 
pressure to deliver quick returns; the KPIs they worked with were 
designed to guarantee immediate success. Yet, there were concerns that, 
to some extent, this came at the expense of long-term investments vital 
to address fundamental challenges and safeguard the company’s future: 
‘We are listed on the stock market and therefore have only one prime 
goal: being attractive for investors. (…) When investors lose interest 
in our company, our cash flow will decline, we will have no resources 
to invest. Consequently, our potential as a venture diminishes; we 
cease to exist.’ (R1). 
We also noted doubts about TUI’s new strategy. Some wondered 
whether the integrated tourism company concept would be viable in the 
market of the Western region, which was structurally shrinking. Others 
wondered whether TUI had got what it would take to implement this 
new strategy. Despite all the efforts to distance itself from traditional 
tour operating, they felt that TUI Benelux remained mired in traditional 
tour operating conventions. 
Some board members of TUI Benelux shared these worries. There 
were doubts about the persisting convention that TUI always had to 
compete on price and the corresponding need for operational excellence, 
despite all efforts to emphasise the TUI brand: 
‘Take for instance a five-star all-inclusive trip to Turkey. Nobody 
cares about whether the accommodation belongs to TUI. (…). I think 
if you ask the average customer what tour operator they booked 
with, they will give you the name of their travel agency…. As a 
result, we primarily compete on price. The customer simply does not 
care about the tour operator they booked with. And people who do 
not care about that, base their choice on price’ (R12). 
In addition, the establishment of the innovation unit prompted 
discontent within various organisational practices. Some felt unhappy 
with their workload and described how (their) innovation efforts failed 
because they got stuck in project groups with unmotivated people (R2; 
R3; R5; R8; R9). Others argued this was due to a flawed employee 
assessment process and a correspondingly low staff turnover rate: 
‘When I accept a new task, I keep my present workload; none of my 
current tasks are redistributed to others.’ (R5) 
‘Managers seem reluctant to score their staff either high or low. 
Obviously, there are a lot of people doing the same job, which makes 
it more difficult, but if people are constantly graded 3 out of 5 it 
results in a lack of sharp-mindedness, a lack of feedback. So, yeah, 
individuals are valued here, but also people that should be doing 
something else.’ (R8) 
Talking about innovation made people complain about managerial 
hierarchy complicating idea uptake. In their eyes, disliked or misun-
derstood ideas were dropped; and the grounds for these decisions were 
often unclear. Also, when managers liked ideas, this did not 
automatically result in implementation: 
‘If he (the manager) likes it then he will work on it himself or pass it 
through to the general manager.’ (R9) 
Others felt that TUI missed a method to systematically learn from 
mistakes. According to some, the problem was not that mistakes 
happened, but the astonishment, blame-game, and finger-pointing 
following such mistakes, at all levels of the organisation: 
‘I believe this is so bad. Especially senior management has to admit 
mistakes, show that they learned from it, and how they will do a 
better job next time, rather than shifting the blame onto others, or 
even denying that something went wrong in the first place. That 
would show a lot more leadership and professionalism.’ (R8) 
These tensions and conflicts – confronting innovation team members 
with their own conflicting loyalties (cf. Grabher, 2004) – revealed 
discontent with the functioning of the organisation. From April 2018 
onwards, some of this discontent created a ‘burning platform’ for 
reflection on TUI’s current situation and its future (cf. Van Assche et al., 
2020), as it was turned into a productive argument to create a sense of 
urgency and mobilise support for an integrated innovation approach in 
TUI Benelux. We examine this next. 
5.3. The transformative function of innovation 
Some argued that, in TUI Benelux, innovation had become an aim in 
itself. This, they felt, fostered inertia rather than a transformation of 
organisational routines. 
‘Everybody wants to have the word innovation in his or her job title 
or company, since it is hip and trendy. They just want to paste the 
name on it, but don’t want the action. So, eventually, nothing gets 
done.’ (R4) 
‘Sometimes, I have the feeling that we are innovating just to inno-
vate, just because we have to, not because our heart is really in it.’ 
(R5) 
Yet, the events since February 2018 paint a different picture. 
Initially, indeed, there was inaction. A period of lack of resolve followed 
the unproductive design sprint of February 2018. That spring, there was 
no joint evaluation, with or without the board, on the failed attempt to 
establish the innovation engine. There was simply no time to learn from 
mistakes: 
‘We are always running (…) from project to project. Always in a 
hurry. Often, we do not even complete a project, because there is 
already something new that demands our attention. We never stop. 
We never look back, and think about how did I do this, how can I do 
this better next time?’ (R13) 
At that point, interest in the necessity of changing the culture of the 
organisation had waned. The board was under the impression that cul-
ture change had been achieved. Staff, after all, had been granted more 
freedom, but the problem was, as we were told, that they did nothing 
useful with that freedom. 
This was followed by a period in which the concept of innovation 
displayed its transformative function. From the summer of 2018 on-
wards, the first 8 months of the innovation unit, with the innovation 
team and innovation engine, evolved into a history of failure, in which 
some of the organisational discontent was used to explain the engine’s 
lack of success (cf. Akrich et al., 2002a). Staff were overburdened and 
lacked the required know-how. The engine lacked a clear scope and sat 
in an organisation that rarely granted people time for reflection, to think 
things through: 
‘Initially, I went straight into doing new things, full focus on new 
passengers, new services, but it did not work. I ran into a brick wall, 
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in spite of my drive, of working 24 hours a day. I blamed it on other 
people (colleagues). But they were not to blame. The cause of failure 
was a lack of time, and that people simply do not know how to do 
new things. They have been trained to do their daily jobs.’ (R13) 
(In such situations) ‘one tends to forget, what is actually the problem 
we are trying to solve. The essence. Verify for whom we are doing it. 
What are suitable solutions? (…) A lot of it was waste because it did 
not create any customer value. We were doing the wrong things.’ 
(R13). 
Lessons were learned too. Developing and delivering new products 
and services and tapping into new markets requires an organisational 
culture embracing innovation and staff that strive for constant self- 
improvement: 
‘So, a culture of constant improvement contributes to an innovation 
culture, contributes to innovation and contributes to customer 
value.’ (R13) 
To accomplish this, the history of the innovation team and innova-
tion engine was integrated into a new narrative, in which the innovation 
unit re-emerged, this time renamed as the ‘employee journey’. The en-
gine metaphor and its mechanical, impersonal, and product-oriented 
connotations gave way to an emphasis on inclusive employee develop-
ment. The focus had moved from solving problems to fostering talent 
while achieving efficiency gains: two elements that fitted – and 
contributed to – TUI’s concurrent strategy (see TUI Group, 2018). 
Process excellence is the creation of spare time. And innovation, ‘is 
using that time to address tomorrow’s challenges and opportunities.’ 
(R13). 
The narrative of the ‘employee journey’ was subsequently used to 
create leverage for an integrated innovation approach in TUI Benelux. It 
downplayed the importance of the innovation team and innovation 
engine. The team’s struggles were retrospectively labelled as an 
‘experimentation phase’, ‘chaos’, and a necessary first step that involved 
‘ambassador’ employees, generated initial ideas, and harboured exper-
iments, like the failed design sprint in February 2018. The team’s lack of 
success was instrumentally insignificant: it did not harm the organisa-
tion, affect sales, scare customers, et cetera. Yet, rhetorically, it made a 
valuable pretext for the employee journey, strengthening the plot of this 
narrative. Failure lends itself well to dramatisation (Czarniawska, 
1998). In our case, failure was strategically deployed to create a sense of 
urgency: 
‘Sometimes, you just have to create that sense of urgency, you know, 
like, dear people, it is really great I am working on this, but it is not 
going to work. And then actually show that it is not going to work.’ 
(R13) 
‘You get (leverage), because I have this burning platform, and that is, 
I think, to create that sense of urgency, and I think I am good at that.’ 
(R13) 
The ‘employee journey’ aided coalition building (cf. Nordin & 
Hjalager, 2017; Rodriguez-Sanchez et al., 2019) and provided focus to 
innovation discussions (cf. Van Assche et al., 2020). Upon completion of 
our case, we learned that initial reactions among TUI staff were positive. 
There was a feeling that this time they were on the right track. 
6. Conclusion and discussion 
In this paper, we examined the productive role of innovation in a 
large tourism organisation (TUI). Our study showed that in this orga-
nisation innovation is subject to many interpretations and definitions. 
These ‘misunderstandings’ about innovation initially created a self- 
perceived failure as it generated tensions and conflicts typical of 
efficiency-driven organisational cultures (see Doz & Kosonen, 2010). It 
also enhanced reflexivity within the organisation by highlighting 
different forms of discontent with the functioning of the organisation, 
including doubts and speculations about TUI’s future, corporate strat-
egy, and its implementation. Some forms of organisational discontent 
operated as ‘known unknowns’ that staff were generally aware of but did 
not directly communicate to management. Other forms of organisational 
discontent were part of an implicit knowledge within the organisation 
that foregrounded when the innovation unit was being set up and people 
discussed innovation. The different forms of discontent made the 
structural limits of innovation in the organisation explicit. Posed as 
barriers to innovation (cf. Rodgriguez-Sanchez et al., 2019), they func-
tioned as a reservoir of productive arguments that enabled strategising 
actors to mobilise support for their agendas and actions. In the end, this 
resulted in a version of the innovation unit – the employee journey – that 
bolstered TUI’s concurrent corporate strategy and with that the position 
of its proponents: the TUI management. 
In TUI Benelux, the concept of innovation thus eventually strength-
ened established institutions and actors (cf. Kooij et al., 2012). In other 
words, ‘doing innovation’ simultaneously undermined and stimulated 
innovativeness in this organisation, thereby demonstrating the paradox 
of innovation (Bontems, 2014). On the one hand, the discursive presence 
of innovation in organisational practices generated fundamentally 
different understandings of the organisation’s future. On the other hand, 
it illuminated the transformation of this wish to innovate into the con-
servative practice of gradually adding minor modifications to the status 
quo. Or, as Bontems (p. 55) puts it, “everything must change so that 
everything can stay the same”, highlighting innovation’s political 
dimension: ‘politics’, i.e. coalition building, is not a phase or task than 
can be delimited and planned in the innovation process (cf. Rodri-
guez-Sanchez et al., 2019), but is inherent to the use of the concept in 
organisations. 
6.1. The productive role of innovation 
This paper studied innovation as a concept with multiple meanings 
that are produced through organisational practices. This approach di-
verges from many studies measuring innovativeness, which tend to as-
sume that definitions of innovation are well-understood in organisations 
(cf. Tajeddini, 2010). Human aspects of innovation, i.e. the recognition 
of opportunities, the acceptance of and willingness to take risks and 
change, are often reduced to proxy variables fit for measurement (see e. 
g. Fraj et al., 2015; Kallmuenzer & Peters, 2018; Martínez-Román et al., 
2015). The resulting statistics on innovation and related terminology 
depict innovation as a technical matter and obscure that innovation 
involves many different negotiations with uncertain outcomes. 
This approach also deviates from studies examining the innovation 
process and its sources (see e.g. Lowe, Williams, Shaw, & Cudworth, 
2012; Nordin & Hjalager, 2017; Smith et al., 2016). These studies also 
highlight innovation’s inherent uncertainty, but focus on the (com-
bined) character traits and cognition, i.e. the acquired knowledge and 
skills, of specific (collaborating) people. Both literatures display an 
actor-focused interpretation of agency (cf. Garud et al., 2014). 
Contributing to and at the same time diverging from these bodies of 
literature, we examined the possibility that the concept of innovation, 
through its presence and use in organisational practices, also accrues 
agency. 
Our study showed that the concept of innovation served as an open 
concept to ‘store’ a multiplicity of interpretations. This makes innova-
tion not only an attractive management idea, but also a political device 
in organisations (Czarniawska, 2009). Strategising actors operating 
under the innovation banner can pursue different goals as they turn 
circulating interpretations into productive narratives and mobilise 
support for their agendas, without disclosing the disparities that would 
be obvious if the innovation lexicon were more exact (Bontems, 2014). 
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These narratives necessarily fluctuate to maintain their function as 
“trigger for actions towards goals that are forever changing” (Garud 
et al., 2014, p. 1181). In our case, the evolving enactment of distinct 
organisational representations about the organisation of change – the 
‘innovation engine’ and ‘employee journey’ – created impressions of 
knowing, of collective reasoning and of consensus that is necessary to 
maintain coordination in an organisation (cf. Kooij et al., 2012; Van 
Assche et al., 2020). Thus, ‘innovation’ can become productive through 
its conceptual vagueness. Vagueness allows actors to contextualise 
innovation through evolving narratives that gradually add more specific 
meanings to the concept and delineate innovation in an organisation (cf. 
Garud et al., 2014). This raises implications for (tourism) innovation 
research. 
6.2. Innovation beyond accomplishment 
The findings of our study open up analytical space to evaluate the 
productive role of innovation as a concept for the creation and adoption 
of novelty in tourism organisations. We therefore encourage researchers 
measuring innovativeness to treat vagueness as an important empirical 
feature of innovation, rather than as a definitional and methodological 
obstacle inhibiting its accurate measurement (see e.g. Montresor, 2018; 
Camisón & Monfort-Mir, 2012). Innovation accumulates different 
meanings that result in site-specific effects that are not easily foreseen or 
masterminded (cf. Kooij et al., 2012). We argue that it is precisely the 
anticipated and unanticipated, wanted and unwanted, reality effects 
that simultaneously strengthen and limit innovativeness in organisa-
tions. They can turn discussions about innovation into actual innova-
tion, or its opposite. Rather than veiling innovation’s conceptual 
vagueness with presupposed substance (Van Assche et al., 2014), studies 
measuring innovativeness in organisations, we believe, should 
acknowledge these contradictory effects. Innovativeness thus, is best 
observed as an emergent effect embedded in distinct organisational 
practices. To acknowledge this specificity, studies can use more proxi-
mate (micro- or meso-level) performance indicators (Guérard et al., 
2013), or develop context-specific indicators in collaboration with ac-
tors in the organisation. 
For the same reason, we call for researchers examining the innova-
tion process to foreground innovation’s political dimension in their 
studies. Coalition building, rather than a processual stage or task that 
can be delimited and planned (cf. e.g. Rodriguez-Sanchez et al., 2019), 
can be viewed as integral to innovation itself; narratives play a promi-
nent role in this process (Garud et al., 2014). The accomplishments that 
individuals describe when describing their innovation journeys can 
result from prior intention or hindsight attribution and are strengthened 
through observation (Van Assche et al., 2020). We therefore believe that 
there is value in evaluating the accounts of these innovators not only for 
content-related aspects (see e.g. Lowe et al., 2012; Nordin & Hjalager, 
2017), but also for their productive functions. 
And lastly, we invite practitioners to evaluate innovation beyond 
output-based performance indicators. In (tourism) business and beyond, 
innovation is generally understood and represented in the context of 
competitiveness. In this frame, the difference between successful and 
failed innovation equates the realisation of distinct outputs – new 
products, technologies, processes, et cetera – that are expected to ach-
ieve a (competitive) advantage for organisations (see Pikkemaat et al., 
2019). This frame, we conclude, is too narrow: innovation comprises 
generative and transformative functions in organisation. Output is an 
important aspect of innovation, but requires and results from divergent 
interpretations and ideas about novelty and its limitations in organisa-
tion. A one-sided focus on output, thus, risks failing to grasp these other 
important functions of innovation. Process-based indicators, such as 
indicators that capture the ability of an organisation to reflect on its own 
practices and learn from its successes and failures, are equally 
important. 
6.3. Final remarks 
Innovation will remain prominent in organisations, as a discourse, a 
goal, boardroom rhetoric, as practice and so on, not less so in the (post-) 
COVID-19 era. Actors pursuing change, like the TUI Benelux staff, will 
always run up against structural limits of some kind (Akrich et al., 
2002a, 2002b). Ultimately, their desire for recognition drives submis-
sion to and mastery of the dominant organisational discourse (Laine, 
Meriläinen, Tienari, & Vaara, 2016). In TUI, as we showed, this is a 
discourse of corporate venturing: maintaining profitability for the 
company’s shareholders. In times of crisis, this discourse arguably gains 
prominence. Successful corporate venturing requires top-level coordi-
nated responses to secure shareholder and related executive interests. At 
the same time, top-down coordination and control progressively limits 
space for open-dialogue, productive conflicts and misunderstandings, 
and the consideration of new ideas. In the case of TUI Benelux, this 
contributed to the rigidities that limit the kind of innovation deemed 
necessary by those working to instigate change from within. 
There are various ways to soften these rigidities and strengthen the 
adaptive capacities of efficiency-driven organisations. Reflexivity at 
board level can be strengthened (see Doz & Kosonen, 2010) and 
organisational structures that separate exploration from exploitation 
can be installed (see O’Reilly & Tushman, 2004). We believe that 
acknowledging and stimulating the productive role of innovation as an 
open concept in organisations can smoothen the entire process. Open 
concepts enable actors to mediate present and future uncertainties 
(Kooij et al., 2012), like those presented by the current COVID-19 
pandemic (Gössling, Scott, & Hall, 2020). They accommodate constant 
adaptation, also when actors cannot admit this: plans and policies rarely 
work out as intended, yet their presence in organisations is essential 
(Van Assche et al., 2020). To make innovation more productive within 
an organisation, the vagueness of this concept should therefore be 
cherished rather than scorned. 
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